Journal of Veterinary Medical Science
Vol. 71 (2009) , No. 2 February pp.133-138
Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom
Katsuaki SUGIURA1), Toyoko KUSAMA1), Tomotaro YOSHIDA1), Naoki SHINODA1) and Takashi ONODERA2)
1) Food and Agricultural Materials Inspection Center 2) Department of Molecular Immunology, University of Tokyo
(Received 10-Mar-2008) (Accepted 3-Sep-2008)
ABSTRACT. All cattle imported from the United Kingdom to Japan since 1980 and slaughtered before 2002 were traced (n=33), and the number of cattle that were possibly infected with BSE and entered the animal feed chain was calculated. Because there was no effective system to avoid recycling of the BSE agent via animal feed until the early 1990s, of the 33 cattle imported from the UK into Japan, most probably 7 or 8 were infected and entered the animal feed chain, 2 of which entered the animal feed chain in each of 1992 and 1993. In terms of infectivity, 400-550 cattle oral ID50 of the BSE agent entered the feed chain in each of these years. The amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1991 and 1995 was smaller but still substantial, suggesting that the BSE agent might have entered the Japanese feed chain in any of these years.
KEY WORDS: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), import risk analysis, Japan, live cattle, simulation
snip...
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of this study indicate that, if BSE had been introduced into Japan by live cattle imported from the UK, it would have most probably entered Japan through cattle imported in 1987 and 1988 and that infectivity would then have been most likely introduced into the feed system through MBM produced from carcasses or waste materials from one or more of these cattle when they were slaughtered or died during 1992–1993. This is consistent with the results of Sugiura’s previous study reported in 2004 [11].
The results of this study also indicate that a substantial amount of BSE infectivity is likely to have been released into the feed chain by imported cattle from the UK in 1992 and 1993, and a small but still substantial amount of BSE infectivity is likely to have been released in 1989, 1991 and 1995. Considering the amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain and the absence of a cattle/BSE system that would avoid processing of infected cattle and recycling the BSE agent via the feed chain (SRM removal, pressurized heat treatment of MBM, and an effective feed ban were not practiced or in place), one can assume that some Japanese cattle born in the early 1990s became infected by consuming contaminated MBM produced from these imported cattle.
Of the 35 BSE cases detected in Japan by the end of April 2008, 13 were born in 1995–1996, 19 were born in 1999– 2001, two were born in 1992 and one was born in 2002. Considering the substantial amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1995 and that cattle get infected within one year of birth [17], the cases born in 1995–1996 might have been infected by consuming feed containing infected MBM produced in 1995 or by recycling of cattle infected in 1989–1993. Of the two BSE cases born in 1992, one was atypical, and the other was typical, which might have been infected by consuming feed containing infected MBM produced in 1991–1993.
The results of the present study are consistent with the conclusion made by Yoshikawa et al. in their report [18], that the imported cattle from the UK that were slaughtered in an abattoir in the Kanto region in 1995 and whose rendered byproducts were used in that region, possibly became the source of infection for the three BSE cases detected in this region.
In Sugiura’s previous study [11], only the cattle that developed BSE (i.e., had reached the last stage of the incubation period) were assumed to be infectious. As a result, the probabilities that BSE entered the animal feed chain might have been underestimated. The present study has overcome this problem by using prevalence of infection (probability of being infected) instead of using incidence rate (probability of developing clinical signs) for each birth cohort.
In the present study, we assumed that the cattle imported from the UK all died or were slaughtered for non-BSE reasons because according to the official records, none of them showed clinical signs compatible with BSE at death/slaughter. However, most of the 33 animals had some clinical signs at death/slaughter, such as reproductive disorder, arthritis, mastitis, post-parturition downer, ketosis, rumen displacement [18], and some of them might have died or been culled after having completed the incubation period. As a result, the amount of infectivity that entered the animal feed chain might have been underestimated.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ database [18], the amount of MBM used between 1989 and 1995 as raw material for the production of cattle compound feed was 83 to 247 metric tons annually, representing less than 0.05% of the total amount of MBM used for feed (most of the MBM used for feed was used for production chicken and pig feed). In addition, co-farming of ruminants and non-ruminants is not a common practice in Japan. These facts suggest that, of the 1,080–1,460 cattle oral ID50 that were estimated to have entered the animal feed chain between 1989 and 1995, the amount of BSE agent consumed by cattle would be much smaller, and thus the amount of BSE agent estimated should be considered the maximum amount consumed by cattle. Considering that the BSE agent is likely to be heterogeneously distributed in feedstuffs [16] and that no information was available about how heterogeneously the BSE agent was distributed in feed in Japan, the authors suggest that, without calculating the possible number of infected animals, the calculated amount of ID50 represents the maximum amount that would have been consumed by cattle.
Fig. 2. Probability distributions of the number of infected animals that entered the animal feed chain from (a) the total of 33 cattle imported from the UK, (b) the 5 cattle imported from the UK in 1982, (c) the 9 cattle imported from the UK in 1987 and (d) the 19 cattle imported from the UK in 1988.
Fig. 4. Amount of BSE infectivity that entered the animal feed chain in Japan by year. Solid, dashed and dotted lines assume doubling time of 4 months, 2 months and 1 month, respectively
snip...end
http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/71/2/133/_pdf
REFERENCES
http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/71/2/71_133/_cit
Greetings BSE-L members !
>>>Because there was no effective system to avoid recycling of the BSE agent via animal feed until the early 1990s, of the 33 cattle imported from the UK into Japan, most probably 7 or 8 were infected and entered the animal feed chain, 2 of which entered the animal feed chain in each of 1992 and 1993. In terms of infectivity, 400-550 cattle oral ID50 of the BSE agent entered the feed chain in each of these years. The amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1991 and 1995 was smaller but still substantial, suggesting that the BSE agent might have entered the Japanese feed chain in any of these years.<<< href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf
OTHERS
BEEF AND VEAL
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab08.pdf
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab09.pdf
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab10.pdf
LIVE CATTLE
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf
FATS
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab01.pdf
EMBRYOS
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab03.pdf
GELATIN ETC
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab02.pdf
SEMEN
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab04.pdf
MEAT
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada "Three of four possible manufacturers supplying a protein supplement likely fed to the animal could have included meat and bone meal (MBM) as an ingredient in its formulation. One of these manufacturers was able to confirm usage of meat and bone meal in supplements and confirm a source of MBM to be one common to previous BSE investigations."
USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989
USA = 496
CANADA = 198
*add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf
HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK live cattle and greaves exports ;
UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96
USA 697 LIVE CATTLE
CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf
UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995
USA 24 TONS
CANADA 83 TONS
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf
HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS
Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???
From: mailto:S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000
To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000439/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)
Terry
Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to the US are listed below:
Country Tonnes
1980
1981 12
1982
1983
1984 10
1985 2
1986
1987
1988
1989 20
1990
Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C
============ END...TSS...2008============
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Wednesday, July 23, 2008 Audit says USDA lost track of imported cattle Report No. 50601-0012-Ch March 2008
Audit says USDA lost track of imported cattle Canada has reported 13 cases of mad cow
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Greetings,
Considering that Mad Cow disease of all documented phenotypes, either the c-BSE, or the atypical h-BSE and or the l-BSE, ALL of which have been documented in North America, how many more, who knows, but they seem to be throwing all there marbles in the pot now by calling the h-type BSE 'familial'. what happens if we come up with another strain ? kinda like the sporadic FFI, that's not familial, what's that all about ? considering the many different strains of the typical scrapie 20+, and then the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which the USA has documented 6 cases the last i heard, and the thought of more than one strain of CWD in deer and elk, where will the next year, 4 years, 8 years, and beyond take us in the world of human and animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and 'sound science' in the USA ? WILL the New Administration see the enfamous enhanced bse surveillance program of 2004 for what it was, a fraud, and have a 'redo' ? WE can hope i suppose. ...TSS
Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198
snip...end
source :
Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD
Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM
"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."
personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS
see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
November 25, 2008
Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/november-2008-update-on-feed.html
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
"the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine."
just another one of those sporadic CJD coincidences i suppose $$$
NOT to forget ;
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
Vet. Res. (2008) 39:15 DOI: 10.1051/vetres:2007053 c INRA, EDP Sciences, 2008 Review article
snip...
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
snip...
Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
please see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
BUT first, here in the USA, we must have a redo of the infamous 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up surveillance program.
Friday, August 29, 2008
CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html
Sunday, March 16, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008
snip...
Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants Manuscript of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...
snip...
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html
Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/01/oie-amending-annex-to-decision.html
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
NOW, ask yourself why not one single mad cow has been documented in the USA since the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around Johanns, Dehaven et al ??? found two atypical BSE or BASE cases and they flat shut it down i tell you. IF the OIE gives a favorable rating, IF the OIE gives any other rating but the lowest, poorest possible BSE/TSE rating, the OIE will have sealed there fate once and for all, because most of the world knows the truth about the USA and there mad cows. THE OIE will then be able to stand side by side with the USA, and proudly claim to have sold there soul to the devil, all for a buck, commodities and futures, to hell with human health. A 'CONTROLLED' RATING IS EXACTLY what the OIE will get if that is what they classify the USA as a 'CONTROLLED RATING'. IT will be controlled by Johanns, Dehaven, and GW. IT WILL BE RIGGED in other words. but that is nothing new, it's been rigged for years. ...
snip...
SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
Attachment to Singeltary comment January 28, 2007 Greetings APHIS, I would kindly like to submit the following to ; BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 [Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
[[Page 1101]]
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e
CHAPTER 3 Animal Disease Eradication Programs and Control and Certification Programssnip...In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation study case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with a variant of the disease known as Nor98 scrapie.1 These five cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming, and Indiana, respectively.snip...
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/AHR_Web_PDF_07/D_Chapter_3.pdf
NOR-98 Scrapie FY 2008 to date 1
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps
ATYPICAL TSEs in USA CATTLE AND SHEEP ?
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Document (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
Download file (0.3Mb)
Publication date: 20 August 2004 Last updated: 8 September 2004
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779461.htm
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Canada Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Document (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
Download file (0.3Mb)
Publication date: 20 August 2004 Last updated: 8 September 2004
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779443.htm
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Mexico Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Document (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993.
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live ‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.
EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.
Download file (0.2Mb)
Publication date: 20 August 2004 Last updated: 8 September 2004
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779452.htm
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true
THE only reason the USA is not documenting any cases of TSE in the USA bovine is simple, there not looking, and have not looked/TESTED correctly. There is no telling what the true count of BSE, either typical or atypical that is truly in the USA and all of North America. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
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